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Abstract
This chapter presents the criteria that sociological explanations and theories must 
cover and their role in empirical research based on quantitative methods. These crite-
ria are: (1) must regain the phenomenon’s intrinsic causality; (2) must reconstruct the 
conditions in which a social phenomenon surges and develops, although a historical 
methodology is insufficient in many cases; (3) must develop a second-order observa-
tion. Empirical sociological research that resorts to the quantitative method is among 
first-order observations. The second-order research are those that makes the first-order 
observations their subject of observation, which is why sociology, unlike other sciences, 
is a discipline that has itself as object of study (the sociology of sociology); and (4) must 
separate the intentions of the actors’ actions from their effects. The first-order observa-
tion based solely on establishing statistical relationships, such as those performed by 
sociobiology, can offer the appearance of high scientific validity. In its last part, this 
chapter offers an example of the need to complete or reject data with second-order 
theoretical observations.
Keywords: theory, explanation, statistics, modern thinking, first-and second-order 
observation
1. Introduction
This chapter answers the following question: what relationship is there between the data-
gathering and statistically oriented empirical research and the theoretical formulation and 
explanations of the social sciences? Even though it might seem obsolete after the discus-
sions promoted by the rise of positivism, this question has obtained renewed relevance, due, 
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among other reasons, to the predominance of the comparative-descriptive method in socio-
logical and psychological research and that it has become one of the main analysis method-
ologies for society. Away from other debates, the comparative-descriptive analysis’s only 
justification is its empirical reference; its goal doesn’t offer anything beyond a picture of 
the similarities and differences observed in national societies. For example, there are inves-
tigations about the differences in moral values or unemployment, birth, marriage, divorce, 
mortality rates, and so on. This stems from the conviction that the comparison between social 
groups or between regions within a nation facilitates getting to know a society. Indeed, its 
results make it clear that there are differences within societies, for example, between north 
and south, east and west, and so on. However, these differences between one region and 
another, between the north and south of Italy, for example, tell very little about what makes 
the Italian society a society. This type of research appeals to empirical researchers or sociolo-
gists, although it barely helps to explain the emergence of society as a rising phenomenon. 
Society does not result from it. Many of its parts are classified and assessed, but their sum 
does not make a society [1].
Another reason why it is important to ask the question about the relationship between the sta-
tistical data elaboration method and theory is the current conditions in social science research. 
Subjected to the logic of project financing, many observers of society are forced to present 
“useful” results, inspired by logical positivism. At the end of their work, they invariably 
maintain that their conclusions have been rigorously tested, that they are based on first-hand 
experiences, and that they have resulted from logical analysis. The result has been a colossal 
amount of empirical knowledge, which is hardly the object of a second-order observation, 
with explanatory aims, or rebuttals that lead to social theories.
In terms of Piaget’s theory, it could be said that a formal-operational thinking exercise, which 
considers the thought and not only reality itself, is needed [2]. Data alone say nothing. To 
understand it, a reasoning is necessary that thoughtfully relates it to ideas that give it a mean-
ing. Concisely, it can be said that there is too much sociological research and a growing theo-
retical deficit. One of the reasons that have led to this is easily identified: in terms of projects 
financing, the institutional preference to support quantitative research that provides immedi-
ate political usefulness instead of the thoughtful sociological observation.
Another reason why we are inclined to consider the relationship between empirical research 
and the scientific and theoretical explanation is the recent emergence of a global society and 
regional societies of considerable dimensions, for example, the European society, which rep-
resents a challenge for quantification and theorization [3]. So far, the comparative-descriptive 
method and its statistical resources in sociological research had application within the limits 
of national borders [4]. When we look at the reports provided by the institutes devoted to 
statistical information, as well as the publications resulting from empirical research in social 
sciences, it is possible to argue we are before a “nationalist” methodology [4]. The nation state 
constitutes the basic unit for the calculation of every social research [5]. However, compar-
ative-descriptive research has broadened its application area. Studies, like those performed 
by the OECD in its member states or those done by the European Union through academic 
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agencies or institutions, gather valuable information about nation states´ populations and 
analyze their similarities and differences. However, as indicated before, these comparisons 
help to understand that there are significant differences between countries, for example, they 
help us to understand that the economies of Mexico and Germany are very different, but their 
contribution to understand the world order’s reorganization or the globalization processes 
is not very significant. The challenge for quantification does not derive from the comparison 
between countries with similar social structures but between large regions. Undoubtedly, the 
European national societies can be compared to each other since they are units with multiple 
similar internal factors in a homogeneous social space and can be seen as elements of an insti-
tutionally defined space that encompasses them. However, what can Europe, for example, 
be compared with? Obviously, only with something comparable; with the United States, or 
China, or Latin America, probably [1]. However, due to the large dimensions of these units, 
their complex internal structures of subunits, which interact in a very particular manner, and 
their lack of a common space, it is difficult to establish comparison points. In addition, the 
way to compare regions in a way that contributes to understand the formation process of a 
global society is an open question.
To identify the contribution of quantitative strategies to the formulation of theory, we must pay 
attention to the conditions social sciences thought theories must fulfill. For this, we must first 
explain what is meant by “modern thinking.” From this follows a guide for the construction 
of any social theory. Once the logical cognitive scheme every scientific explanation should be 
based upon is presented, the chapter describes the requirements that should be covered by any 
explanatory or theoretical reflection. First, it points out the need to resort to the conditions in 
which a phenomenon emerges. Any object or event results from a formation process that must 
be causally observed and reconstructed to achieve an explanation. This is also true in natural 
sciences, indispensable to understand diseases or the characteristics of a territory, for example.
Subsequently, the chapter addresses the distinction between first- and second-order observa-
tions, which allows us to distinguish between the empirical research activity and a reflection 
that relates the results of this activity to the wealth of conceptualizations and theories, which 
constitute a solid knowledge and have achieved the understanding of other phenomena, or, 
in any case, constructs it.
Separating the intentions of the members from their effects has resulted essential for the 
study of societies. Society is no longer seen as the result of a collective idea inspired on the 
achievement of the common good. Therefore, in the next point, this distinction is addressed, 
which allows for the entry of categories such as power, competence, or conflict, to explain the 
dynamics of social order and places morality as a relevant means only in a community where 
the neighborly, kinship, or face-to-face relationship ties prevail.
Then, we identify three requirements that may be considered the starting point for any expla-
nation and theorization. In each of them, the role played by quantification is indicated. Given 
the results of statistical instruments that are often linked to assumptions that escape empirical 
verification, I present a sociobiology study at the end as example, which is supported by a 
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rigorous statistical exercise but whose premises and conclusions lack an analytical founda-
tion. Absent this, most thesis, no matter how crazy, can find a statistical basis to give it some 
credibility.
Surely, at this point, specialists in empirical research await an explanation of the observations´ 
methodology followed in this chapter, but methodological strategy is a procedure proper of 
the first-order observations, as we will see hereunder.
2. Requirements for scientific explanations
To answer the question about the relationship between the statistics producing research and 
the scientific explanation, it is necessary to first analyze how explanations are formulated in 
social sciences. The emergence of natural and social sciences is closely linked to a fundamen-
tal change in the historical development of thought that occurred at the beginning of the mod-
ern era. This change is particularly characterized by a break in the logic applied to understand 
and explain the phenomena of the world, or, in a given case, the world itself. Therefore, we 
must clarify what “explaining” means in the modern sense. From this surges every approach 
for society’s theory construction as second-order observation. This radical transformation 
in the scheme or logic of thought, which may well be understood as a cognitive paradigm, 
should be understood as the basic condition for the development of any explanation or theory 
that claims scientific validity.
2.1. The desistance of absolutes as explanation
“The ancients” thought every phenomenon through until they recognized “one clear termi-
nus” [6]. Nowadays, scientists agree that any hypothesis must desist from claiming an abso-
lute origin that provides the ultimate argument. This is the result of the world’s process of 
secularization that accompanied the three modernity revolutions: the revolutions in the natu-
ral sciences, in politics, and in economics.
From the epistemological point of view, this means that it is not possible to understand 
what exists as the product of an absolute origin and that all questions regarding its cause are 
answered by resorting to a single ultimate origin. Günter Dux explains this way of proceed-
ing: “The absolute in premodern thinking, where spirit predominates, was absolute because it 
contained what was to come out of it as substance. The way of explaining consisted of attrib-
uting the explanation to the absolute to make it rise from there as an emanation.” [7]. The 
explanatory potential of resorting to the absolute resided in the impossibility to question it. 
It was impossible to explain something within this logic, since the absolute origin subtracted 
itself from the question about its own cause. In this regard, Dux points out: “In a world that 
turned radically secular, in which… nothing that subtracts itself from a set of conditions can 
be found, the constructively achieved worlds – and their logics – must be explained through 
the conditions that made it be” [7]. Then, it’s not that a certain explanation lost its convincing 
power along the history of thought, but the substitution of an explaining logic for another, of 
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a paradigm for another. According to the old logic, explaining meant to part from the concrete 
object or phenomenon—natural or social—and to assign it an ultimate origin to claim it as its 
cause. This way of proceeding forced us to think of the cause as an origin analogous to what 
would emerge from it. Cause and effect were (partially) identical.
The attempt to find explanations through this process lost strength for the same question 
about the origin that could not be answered by resorting to an absolute origin anymore, not 
without falling into an endless return.
Accordingly, every form of explanation where the explainer is present in the initial explanation 
from which it emerges is unsatisfactory, for example, in the explanation of a social phenome-
non where the said phenomenon is already embedded in the actors’ wills, or in the explanation 
of specific social phenomena that are already in the own qualities of that society [4].
Modern thinking imposes then a first requirement for sociological research: it is not feasible 
to opt for a research strategy where the concept is defined beforehand to apply it then to the 
phenomenon being researched; we would rather have to work the other way, we must per-
form an observation and then specify how it developed.
2.1.1. The survival of the old explanatory scheme
Nevertheless, in many modern sociological and psychological theoretical approaches survive 
remnants of the absolutist and substantialist logic, which are especially visible in sociolo-
gy’s classical theories and authors because during the historical transition from one logic 
to another—and despite their attempt to abandon the old explanatory scheme—they retain 
the idea of an absolute as explanation, but under a different tag. In Durkheim’s sociology of 
religion, for example, “society” is attributed to all forms of religious thought, but this concept 
in his theory does not provide any information about the creation process of mental construc-
tions. Society is the only origin of the social. With regard to religious phenomena, Durkheim 
reaffirms the formula that inspired his sociological theory and is based on the identity logic 
that resort to the Absolute. In it, “society” appears as the origin and cause of all phenomena 
that require explanation.
The general result of the book (The elementary forms of religious life) is that religion is a 
prominently social issue, religious ideas are collective ideas that express collective realities: 
rites are behaviors that can only arise within groups and must be useful to maintain or restore 
certain psychic states of these groups [8]. In a different place: “just like the concept of reli-
gious power and divinity, the concept of soul is not devoid of reality…since society – the only 
source of everything sacred – is not content with moving us from outside temporarily; it is 
permanently installed in us.” [8].
As shown, Durkheim’s concept of society is an ontological construction placed in an all-
explaining position by theory, and society precedes everything which sabotages any other 
possible explanation. The best proof that we are dealing with a secularized form of the meta-
physical structure of thought is provided by Durkheim himself, when he declares that it will 
be necessary to choose between god and society as explanation [9].
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A similar structure is behind several philosophical approaches. For example, in moral phi-
losophy, any attempt to discover the origin of morality already involves morality itself. In 
philosophy, during the fundamentation process, what is intended to be justified is already 
given. In its explanatory reflection, what is to be explained is already in the explanation: 
language is in the origin of language, communication is in the origin of communication, and 
morality, of course, is derived from morality. In the transcendental theory of knowledge, 
morality as a part of reason comes, of course, from reason, but not as a slowly forming con-
struct along the human societies natural history—having as a condition the brain in which 
the reason is not contained beforehand—but in its substantial form, which holds what will 
emerge from it [10].
Likewise, a fall in premodern absolutist logic also occurs in current theoretical approaches, 
which attribute certain characteristics to the concept of society, and then the phenomena in 
this society are seen as consequences of those characteristics. This circularity is found, for 
example, when it is affirmed that the risk society contains several risks, the society of options 
offers many options, or that in the society of experience many things can be experienced. 
All the previous statements are late absolutist historical manifestations, in which finding an 
explanation means to derive effects from a cause established a priori, and in which they are 
already contained. This same logic underlies the systems theory when it says that the explana-
tion of the differences in society requires as starting point the unit of the system of society that 
creates these differences. With the development of thinking in the modern era, this construc-
tion of the concept of society results obsolete [4].
Hence, it is only possible to scientifically accept a concept of society when it allows to explain 
what is to be understood by resorting to empirically verifiable actions in society and asking 
about the existing conceptions of society in praxis. For example, when society is conceptual-
ized as reciprocal forms [11] or as “a network of connections of practical forms, in which men 
lead their lives” [12].
The concept of society must be pointed toward the relationships between elements and must 
neither admit absolutist nor substantial connotations. Vobruba even recommends desisting 
from a pre-formulated definition of society. He points out that this does not mean the end of a 
theory of society; rather, it opens the possibility to articulate a theory with empirical content. 
A theory that can clarify the existing phenomena in practice and can question its causes and 
its effects [4].
Evidently, in this sense, empirical research, including that which uses quantification and vari-
able relations, can be a very valuable instrument for the process of articulation of a concept of 
society. If sociology must deal with social and political events subject to a network of actions 
and social relationships in which these events occur and produce effects, the analysis that 
empirically verifies them, classifies them, and evaluates them represents a first and valuable 
step for a latter theoretical exercise that must retake them and explain them. This way of 
proceeding ensures that the explanation will not be included in the explainer, instead, the 
explanation will resort to the elaboration of a complex relationship between causes and effects 
based on data that portrays reality, that is, that ensure an empirical content.
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2.2. What does explaining mean?
If scientific explanations must desist from resorting to the absolute as argument, what must 
they appeal to then?
Günter Dux very precisely points out what the change in the logic of explanation consists of: 
the absolute is discarded to recover the real causes of the phenomenon itself, in other words, 
a causality that thought imposes on phenomena is abandoned, to reflexively reconstruct the 
real causes inherent to the observed process, that is, the objective relations between things 
[10]. Therefore, the historical decline of absolutist logic as explanation for the phenomena was 
accompanied by the emergence of the diversity of science. At the beginning of the modern 
era, it was no longer possible to resort to an ultimate cause, but each phenomenon showed 
specific determinants that gave rise to the different sciences. A lengthy list of systems replaces 
the limited relationships of the previous logic. According to Piaget:
“There are logical operations such as those resulting from a class system (meeting of individuals) or 
relations, arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, etc., as well as their investments), geometric 
operations (intersection, deviations, etc.), temporary operations (ordering sequences of events and in-
sertion of intervals), mechanical, physical operations, etc.” [13].
In social sciences, the study of the conditions in which cultural forms of life arise made it 
visible that a methodological strategy that assumed the incorporation of history as expla-
nation was required. To understand social phenomena, it was inescapable to resort to their 
formation process, their development. Although the theories of sociology’s classic theorists, 
like Durkheim or Marx, have lost their explanatory power for distinct reasons, they have at 
least the merit of introducing history’s explanatory role. The importance of The Capital for the 
development of knowledge consists of following: the formation of economic development 
from its genesis, first in the commercial capital and then in the industrial capital of the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries.
In the case of psychology, regardless of the current value attributed to psychoanalysis, iden-
tifying mental pathologies as the result of traumatic experiences during the history of the 
individual was the fundamental contribution of Freudian theory. Albeit, a single experience 
and experience type—sexuality—were given too much importance, psychic disturbances 
found their explanation in the subject’s own past. Nowadays, everyone accepts the close 
relationship, discovered by the Freudianism, between an individual’s affectivity and his 
past, especially his childhood [13]. Everything looks different after a revolution.
However, it must be emphasized that scientific work consists of apprehending the intrin-
sic causality in the dynamics of the process. Every sociocultural form of life can only be 
explained if one resorts to the conditions in which it started and under which it has con-
tinued developing. This is what Marx means when he says that there is only one science: 
history [14].
As we have seen, explaining is a concept that assumes a specific meaning in social theories: 
it is about reconstructing the conditions in which the sociocultural forms of organization 
emerged and then evolved.
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A scientific explanation can set spatial and temporal limits to the observation period of the 
conditions in which the social phenomenon of interest arises, while a theory must contem-
plate the core aspect of all its development. It must be capable of generalizing in a way that its 
application covers broader periods of time or a wider range of phenomena.
In a social science theory, the starting point is the set of constellations formed by systemati-
cally organized conditions that influence each other and that only in their joint action give 
rise to the result. In this sense, the methodological logic that is followed is a relational and 
systemic logic. However, it is also a procedural logic. By this, we mean that the result, the 
thought, language, or morality organization forms are not found within the constellation of 
conditions that constitute the starting point. The result is formed in the process. The differ-
ence with the methodology followed by philosophy is evident: in philosophy’s logic of deri-
vations, there never is a new phenomenon. Within the procedural logic, there is room for a 
new phenomenon to arise: life can surge from lifeless matter, from life devoid of spirituality, 
cognition, language, or morality rise.
However, the reconstruction of the conditions in which the sociocultural forms of life were 
formed represents only the first step. If we intend to objectively and scientifically analyze 
the sociocultural forms of life, including current ones, it is necessary to explain why the 
sociocultural forms of life developed and grew in a specific way. Of course, this approach 
involves the task of reflecting on the development of history in its entirety. However, a 
sociological theory is not about advancing the knowledge of the succession of events in 
their outward appearance, but to follow the footsteps of something like a development 
logic that sustains the process. Marx already tried this regarding production systems when 
he found out that the development of the productive forces in human history follows a line 
that started with hunting and gathering, continues with the agricultural forms of produc-
tion and all the way till reaching industrial production. And, who would dare today to 
deny that, in this sense, social evolution is moving in this direction and hence follows a 
logic? In the same way, Piaget endeavored to demonstrate that the ontogenetic cognitive 
development parts from a sensory-motor intelligence go through the preoperational stage 
until reaching the operational and formal-operational stages. And although in the 1980s, a 
discussion arose regarding the universality of the sequence of stages, epistemologists do 
not hesitate to admit that cognition is subject to development and that it registers a logic, 
as Piaget formulated it.
The postmodernist idea that history follows the irrationality tenet undermines the knowledge 
that countless empirical studies have achieved, and we can consider reliable information. At 
this point, the postmodern stand is only based on the reluctance to place oneself in the field 
of knowledge that empirical studies have made available. History is not simply the sequence 
of innumerable events in which each of them differs from the previous state, the sequence of 
life forms with which man becomes accessible and reality follows a logic of development. This 
is precisely what a theory seeks to prove. History, as a man-determined history, in which he 
interprets himself, is susceptible to explanation. In a rigorous analysis of history, it is not pos-
sible to argue that the development has lacked logic, neither in its beginning, nor in its direc-
tion. If history is understood as a series of life forms in which man becomes accessible to the 
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world and interprets himself in it, then it becomes evident that development possesses a logic. 
However, the historical method is not enough for everything [13].
Although one might think that the social sciences should resort to history, this does not nec-
essarily mean a remote past that goes to the very process of formation of the constitution of 
the anthropological species, the conditions in which a phenomenon arises and develops to 
include conditions in the present or recent history, which require empirical verification, espe-
cially in their causality and effectiveness. Quantitative studies provide valuable information 
that can be considered the solid foundation for the explanations and theory formulation. To 
this condition is added a third that distinguishes sociology from other disciplines of the social 
sciences.
2.3. Society under two observation perspectives
To answer the question: what should we consider a scientific approach in a science of society? 
We first must bear in mind that there are two orders of observation and interpretation [15]. 
An observation of the first order is the people’s perspective, who observe and interpret social 
relations and, according to this, act. In the second-order perspective, people’s actions, along 
with their observations and interpretations, are sociologically observed.
The main difference between the first-order observations level and the second-order observa-
tions level lies in the people, which act in relation with a reality on the foundation of their 
first-order observations, while second-order sociological observations are not linked to the 
action. Any sociological definition of society must include as reference the actions of the 
members of society and the knowledge of their actions in which “society” can be identified. 
Since society is built even without sociology’s participation, sociological observation must 
adhere to the way in which people observe and interpret social relationships and act in soci-
ety accordingly. As sociology observes and interprets the observations, interpretations, and 
actions of the people, it assumes the reality with which people act and thus escape the danger 
of constructing arbitrary conceptualizations, since people’s interpretations cannot be of any 
kind if you do not want actions to cause any damage.
Andreas Balog points out that the solid foundation on which the formulation of a concept 
is based, what provides certainty over the identity of the social phenomena and sets limita-
tions to sociological categorization, is common knowledge, which constitutes the basis for 
the orientation of the actors in their daily world and is manifested in their actions and in the 
language of daily life [16]. In this sense, sociology is always a second-order observation.
Thus, since sociology is a second-order observation, its subject of study is society in the sense 
that there is a group that understands itself as society. It is totally irrelevant if the sociologist 
thinks there are no reasons to consider that Paraguay and Uruguay are two different societ-
ies, what matters is that for the people living in Paraguay and Uruguay—that is, in the first-
order observation—there are enough differences to consider them as two different societies. 
In the second-order perspective, the concept of society is applied to recover what in society (as 
empirical group) is perceived and interpreted as society. The concept of society in the second 
order of observation is that which exists and acts in society.
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Given that everything in society can be observed in the second-order sociology, even sociol-
ogy itself, the observes can become themselves observable, or first-order observers. And, since 
everything observed from the second-order perspective turns into first-order observation, 
empirical sociological research becomes first-order observation and sociologists themselves 
become “the people” [4]. When this occurs, it is observed how sociologists observe, interpret, 
and act in the sociological practice. According to Vobruba, sociology can have itself as object 
of study, since it can become its own object of observation (id.).
In the sociological perspective of first-order observations with the purpose of conducting 
research, the concept of society can only be required to cover the field of study. Hence, the 
concepts of society cannot be considered as true or false, but simply as practical or impracti-
cal. Every sociologist, or first-order observer, can formulate a concept of society and deduce 
the consequences that result from it. Sociology’s scientific means do not allow to establish 
“the right concept of society.” Therefore, each author can formulate their own concept, and it 
can also be expected for other observers to present their own different concepts, which can be 
documented empirically with the number of concepts of society available [4].
This differentiates sociology from other disciplines. There cannot be a medicine of medicine, 
nor a legal science of social science, nor an economics of economics. However, there is a soci-
ology of medicine, a sociology of law, a sociology of economics, and, also, a sociology of 
sociology in the sense that a sociological analysis of the cognitive requirements sociology 
must present.
Statistics is a first-order observation. However, this is a better knowledge than which comes 
straight from the senses and which has a subjective character. In this context, better means a 
more direct picture of reality. Hard data are an attempt to understand objective reality in a 
more precise and correct way. However, data alone do not say anything. Second-order con-
ceptual research is necessary to place it in a context that gives it meaning.
2.4. Separating intentions and consequences in social integration
In the past, the concept of society used to designate social groups that were intentionally 
established and were aimed for specific objectives. At the beginning of the modern era, society 
was understood as an intentional institution of equals (bourgeois) for economic purposes. 
Because of this, the concept was used in a more plural often. In the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau thought of society as the product of a consti-
tutive act at some point in history, the result of their intention to ensure peace, protect their 
property, or a willingness to ensure equality and the freedom. Society was understood as the 
product of a social pact that ensured its future integration. Later, the concept of society was 
transferred to problems of social order, which maintained the intentional structure of the 
understanding of society. It was believed that, due to the importance of politics as a guiding 
system for society, it was possible to translate the intentions into any desired political model, 
society was thought of as a malleable political entity.
Durkheim strove to overcome the vision of a society built by a social agreement or to dis-
card the idea of an “invisible hand” that regulated social relations. Because of the division 
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of labor, men in modern society find themselves increasingly in dependency relationships, 
which moderates their selfishness and converts them into moral beings. “In one word: since 
the division of labor becomes the main source of social solidarity, it simultaneously becomes 
the basis of the moral order” [17]. Society’s integration is the result then of a single prin-
ciple: the moral order. However, modern society, unlike a community in which relationships 
occur face to face, is not based on morality. The term “community” is applied to premodern 
relationships, in which ties of kinship and friendship play a key role in social integration, 
but in society this is not the case. In society, a shared morality, outside of a minimum, that 
allows interaction, is not a condition for its constitution. From the epistemological perspec-
tive, Durkheim’s thinking is halfway between the break between absolutist thinking and 
modern thought, between a substantialist conception of society and a conception that under-
stands it as a rising process.
In the second third of the twentieth century, other contributions with important repercussions 
in the way of understanding society emerged. Among them, a new observation approach for 
social relationships linked to the growing inclusiveness of the concept of society was intro-
duced. In this approach, the effects on society are seen and systematized as separate from 
the intentions; the individual intents can have collective consequences that distinguish them-
selves qualitatively from these intents. That was the beginning of the end of the idea that 
society is composed of individual efforts or intentions that seek social unity. The creation 
of a level of observation in which it is possible to separate the intentions from the effects is 
the requirement to deprive the social from the moralization and cognitivization. Society thus 
becomes an object of observation and the materialization of the effects that result from social 
relations.
As soon as the actions´ intentions and effects are disengaged, that is, as soon as it is possible to 
think of society as a result of unintended effects, “the good purposes” lose their significance. 
With this, categories such as inequalities, power struggle, conflict, or antagonisms regain rel-
evance in the conceptualizations of society, and solidarity and morality are reduced to a moti-
vation for action among many others. In modern sociological theories, social phenomena can 
be attributed to actions, but not to the intentions that guide them.
Due to the introduction of the difference between intentions and effects and the disassociation 
of the concept of society from the intentions, a semantic space emerges to separate the con-
cepts of society (unintended) and community (intended). However, there still are sociological 
approaches that try to explain society and all the events that happen in it by the hand of its 
actors´ intentions, and because of this they acquire a futuristic character that starts from the 
good intentions of the social actors.
3. The “short circuit” between empirical results and second-degree 
observation: The case of sociobiology
Empirical research has gathered a considerable amount of valuable descriptions with its 
statistical-descriptive method. The main problem of these investigations is that they are 
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often linked to conclusions, which are based on assumptions that are subtracted from 
empirical verification. This is the case of sociobiology when, before formulating the 
assumptions that will be verified, parts from the idea that social capabilities are contained 
in the genome, for example: studies that conclude a relationship between “racial ancestry” 
and social phenomena subject to other forms of determination. The following is stated in 
one of them [18], for example:
We find that European ancestry is consistently and usually strongly positively correlated with cogni-
tive ability and socioeconomic outcomes (mean r for cognitive ability = .708; for socioeconomic well-
being = .643). And even further:
12 zero order correlational analyses found a substantial positive relationship between European ances-
try and both cognitive ability and general socioeconomic well-being…
While the association between racial ancestry and outcomes is consistent with a genetic hypothesis, to 
obtain decisive evidence in support of such a position, one would need to identify specific alleles that 
vary between ancestral groups which are directly [19] or plausibly indirectly [20] associated with cog-
nitive and/or socioeconomic outcomes on the individual level…[21].1
In the conception of the individual that this study parts from, remnants of absolutist thought 
are still present: the sociocultural forms of life are presented as if they could be explained 
from a genetic a priori. In a second-degree observation, one may ask: What does this mean? 
How important is, for the behavior of an individual, what past generations, in the natural his-
tory of the species, have contributed as genetic material? How exactly does this material lead 
to certain behaviors?
This study shares the false supposition that genetics determines the cognitive level with 
the rest of the sociobiological investigations. The great wealth of psychogenetic and edu-
cational studies, initiated by Jean Piaget, has shown that the determinants of any indi-
vidual’s behavior do not reside in the genes but in learning, the actions of a subject are the 
result of its life experiences. The theoretical attempts to re-naturalize mental capacity have 
failed. To effectively evaluate the influence of the genetic background in cognitive abili-
ties—which the study intends to show—first we need to remember the role played by the 
genes and the development of learning in the natural evolutionary history of the species. 
This way, it must be clear what biological equipment can and cannot do. Let’s take a better 
look at this.
3.1. Theoretical excursus
Undoubtedly, the key to understand the cultural forms of life, including cognition, morality, 
love, and so on, should be sought in the natural history of the species first. The development 
of what characterizes the anthropological species was linked to the natural evolutionary his-
tory. Therefore, sciences try to reconstruct the development of these forms in the long transi-
tion process from animal to man. Some of the key questions sciences seek to answer are: What 
1A more detailed analysis of this investigation as well as the reply of its authors can be found in [22].
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were the conditions that made it possible for the anthropological species to develop the capac-
ity to learn? How was the human being formation process as such possible?
The key process to understand the evolutionary development of the anthropological species 
is the ontogenesis. For millions of years, our species development was characterized by two 
parallel processes: the dissolution of instinctive and inflexible genetically determined forms 
of behavior and enormous learning in the first phases of ontogenesis. Through its relationship 
with the person responsible for its care, the member of the species in initial stages was able 
to acquire experiences that allowed it to increase its actions competence and arrange reality 
into a comprehensible world, which led to a gradual radical change of the genetic material, 
so instinctive structures lost their strength as determinants of the actions. In the transition 
from animal to man, the lengthening of the primary relationship in ontogenetic development 
played a fundamental role. Everything seems to indicate the lengthening of the close mother-
son relationship during the first years of life, and the huge amount of learning that takes place 
here made the instinctive mechanisms ineffective, in a process that lasted thousands of years. 
In the determination of human actions, the genetic basis plays a limited role, it is only present 
in fields closely linked to survival, such as feeding, sexuality, and defense. The evolutionary 
consequence of this process is the extreme inability of the anthropological species to survive 
by itself at birth.
The evolution of the Homo sapiens would not have been possible if functional mechanisms 
for the construction behavior pattern linked to learning had not developed along with 
the dissolution of instinct. Brain development was key for this. Even though we do not 
know much about the brain’s evolutionary development and the formation of differenti-
ated neuronal zones, these made the acculturation process of men possible, and, with it, 
the formation of cognitive and normative structures. There is no doubt that without the 
brain’s constructive capacity, these structures wouldn’t have formed. However, it must be 
clear that these are only brain capacities and not cognitive competences, the latter must be 
acquired in a constructive way by every member of the species in their experiences in the 
outside world.
Since the anthropological constitution hardly has any survival instincts, the member of the 
species in initial stages is forced to develop mechanisms that allow it to lead an independent 
life. In its interaction with the adult, the new member of the species coordinates its motor 
skills, achieves greater competence in its actions, and develops structures that it uses to 
organize the world. The requirement for this to happen is precisely the social relationship 
with the adult in charge of its care, usually the mother. The newborn finds in her not only a 
figure that keeps his body alive but also a representative of the outside world from whom 
he learns a huge amount of behaviors and knowledge. The mother–child dyad is the stage 
during early ontogenesis in which the decisive learning process of survival takes place. Here 
begins every way of understanding reality, all the knowledge about our surrounding envi-
ronment, every thought. For this reason, mother–child interaction and the mental capacities 
acquired in it are of paramount importance in the construction of cultural forms of life, 
especially cognition.
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If we consider the null cultural situation of the newborn and the interactions established in 
the first stage of the biography, there can be no doubt that the conditions at the beginning 
of the formative process at any age and in any society are the same. In every age and in all 
societies, for 40,000 years, the member of the species in the early stage, with nothing but a 
few instincts to ensure its survival, is forced to develop mechanisms that allow it to lead an 
independent life. It is exactly this situation which repeats everywhere what creates equal-
ity in the early cognitive structures. The same conditions in which the process takes place 
determine the same results. Therefore, there is no known society, present, or past, in which its 
members hadn’t started to coordinate their motor skills or build the schemes of object/subject, 
space, time, and causality in the early stage. The same thing that happened to the phyloge-
netic development continues to occur at the beginning of every biography. At this level of 
knowledge, ethnic and cultural differences play no role.
As Piaget pointed out, almost every competence has a biological basis from which they part, 
but human competences are constructive processes, neither human conscience nor subjectiv-
ity is determined by nature, which only offers the opportunity to develop them. The newborn 
doesn’t count with a world in order; for him, there is no space nor time, objects lack shape and 
permanence, and there are no causal relationships between them. Nor does he have the capac-
ity to organize his toward an end and doesn’t even perceive himself as being independent of 
the outside world. He will have to learn all of this through a long constructive process.
3.2. Reconsideration of ethnic determination in cognition
After briefly reviewing the natural history development of the anthropological species, we 
turn our attention to sociobiological studies.
It should be clear by now that human beings do not count with a competence for action nor a 
structure of the self provided beforehand by nature. He doesn’t bring with him the principles 
of social organization, nor does it have enough knowledge of the outer world he is born into. 
Unlike other species, he doesn’t possess an array of the natural elements that, fixed in the 
genetic code, reduce them to the elements relevant for action, as it happens with instinct.
If we bear in mind that at birth every member of the species is in this null cultural situation 
and undertakes a constructive process of the world, and that all of this happens in every 
society and in every age, one must ask, under the precepts of sociobiology: what is the point 
of trying to statistically demonstrate that belonging to a race, or genetic constitution, has any 
relationship with cognitive abilities?
If European, indigenous, or African children are born with a biological equipment that does 
not ensure their survival in any way, and all of them have the same task of undertaking the 
lengthy process of constructing their world and survival competences of action before them, 
how is it possible then to search the reason for the cognitive abilities in genetic differences?
Sociobiology parts from the assumption that cognition forms are found in the genome (more 
recently, in the brain). It assumes that cognition forms are already given in the genetic mate-
rial, and while stored there only wait for an opportunity to manifest. However, the construc-
tion of the cognition forms happen on a stage different from the biochemical evolution.
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Scientific review of what happens in evolution allows us to confirm that sociocultural life 
forms, including cognition, do not take shape in the biological sphere itself, the genome, or 
the brain. The biological sphere does not know of mental abilities, it only provides the condi-
tions to build them. A “naturalization of the mind” on the understanding of human forms 
of existence as links to a species evolution is only admissible in the sense that cognitive, lin-
guistic, normative, and esthetic competences are constructed over natural capacities without 
being stored in them. If we consider the defining role of learning in the acquisition of cognitive 
competences, belonging to a race lacks explanatory validity when trying to find the reasons 
that truly allow to understand the differences between individuals in the field of cognition.
3.3. The detachment of the “ethnicity” variable from the historical and social context
A second argument in sociobiological studies to be challenged is that the “European ances-
try” variable appears detached from its historical and social context; as a consequence, 
statistical relationships formulated with it do not contribute to consider the true problem 
posed by the fact that a white minority, those with a European ancestry, in some Latin-
American countries, show better cognitive abilities and significantly higher income rates 
than the rest.
If we want to comprehend the relationships between these variables, it is necessary to resort to 
history to understand what this relationship truly means and contemplate the changes intro-
duced by the democratization in the composition of power in democratic Latin-American 
societies and which have resulted insufficient to put an end to social inequalities. This is not 
the place to explain in detail what the links with European ancestors mean sociologically, 
because this would require a broad and deep reflection, but the situation with the minority 
of “European ancestors” can at least be mentioned and referred to what is truly significant in 
current sociological studies: its status in the composition of power.
In Latin America, the European arrival at the beginning of the sixteenth century occurred 
through a cruel war of conquest. The Spaniards destroyed the old indigenous world and 
imposed a regime of domination, in which they occupied the positions of civil, ecclesiastical, 
and military power. The indigenous people were not only plundered but were also subjected 
and enslaved. After 300 years, the Latin-American criollos started to drive the Spaniards out 
through the independence war, but this didn’t mean a profound change in the conditions of 
the poor peasants and indigenous people. Independence made way for the development of the 
middle class and brought a certain improvement in the situation of the mestizos. In Mexico, it 
wasn’t until after the 1910 Revolution that the old rural regime, based on the concentration of 
land in large private states, disappeared to finally make way in the 1917 Constitution for some 
of the demands of peasants and workers.
Despite industrial progress, the expansion of the middle class, the considerable increase in 
miscegenation, and even the democratic advances in Latin-American countries, regional elites 
have maintained certain ethnic purity since colonial times. However, traits such as skin color 
and race purity are unimportant in sociological analysis; what truly matters is the perma-
nence of the same elite at the top of the composition of power and the mechanisms that have 
kept them in power.
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The statistical analysis of European ancestry in a network of variables is irrelevant consider-
ing the dramatic fact that, despite the arrival of democracy, those who have European ances-
try continue to hold privileged positions in the composition of power, and indigenous people 
(10% of the Mexican population) keep occupying the population segments in extreme poverty.
4. Conclusions
The need to rethink the relationship between empirical research that uses quantitative meth-
ods and the articulation of explanations and theories results from three circumstances:
1. The valuable material provided by the comparative-descriptive analysis is insufficient to 
formulate an explanation of social phenomena.
2. There is a growing theoretical deficit in sociological research due to the impressive amount 
of first-order observations.
3. Globalization represents a challenge for empirical research, but also for its explanation and 
theorization.
The aim of this chapter is to state the criteria that sociological reflection must fulfill to articu-
late an explanation and a theory.
The first one comes from the fundamental change in the history of thought at the beginnings 
of modern thought, which replaces a logic that resorts to an ultimate absolute origin as expla-
nation for a relational-procedural logic. However, remains of the old logic survive today in 
numerous explanations, approaches, and theories.
In the modern sense, explaining means to resort to the conditions a phenomenon arises from, 
in other words, to cognitively recover its intrinsic causality. However, a method that resorts 
to history is not enough. It requires a second-order observation that analyzes the first-order 
empirical observations and associates them to other knowledge. Statistical data from empiri-
cal research must be subject of a professional sociological observation that correlates it with 
the knowledge that has been recognized as objective and valid by the scientific community.
The reflections made by a second-order observation of the statistical material from sociobi-
ology, especially those studies that statistically link “European ancestry” with income and 
cognitive levels, show that in quantitative methodology, variables that in social reality are 
immersed in a network of historical, social, and political relationships are taken out of context 
to form part of a two-dimensional statistical model. Without a reflection that contributes to 
give meaning to the data, the mere enunciation of correlations does not offer possibilities to 
explain any of the phenomena it deals with.
In the case of the existing relationships between race and cognitive abilities analyzed by the 
sociobiology, they follow the already historically overcome early logic. This logic parts from 
what is before it and refers to an origin in which is already contained what is to result from it. 
Statistics - Growing Data Sets and Growing Demand for Statistics22
In this sense, whether in the race or genes, what is to emerge from them is already contained 
in them. In this reasoning, what truly determines cognitive abilities, the learning develop-
ment, is left out.
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